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Abstract 
Across Western Europe, unions have increasingly engaged in staging general strikes against 
governments since 1980. This increase in general strikes is puzzling as it has occurred at the 
same time as economic strikes have been on the decline. We posit that theories developed to 
explain economic strikes hold little explanatory power in accounting for variation in general 
strikes across countries and over time. Instead, we develop a framework based on political 
variables; in particular, whether governments have included or excluded unions in framing 
policy reforms; the party position of the government; and the type of government. Our 
empirical analysis, based on a conditional fixed-effects logit estimation of 84 general strikes 
between 1980 and 2006, shows that union exclusion from the process of reforming policies, 
government strength, and the party position of the government can provide an initial 
explanation for the occurrence of general strikes.  
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Introduction 
Between 1980 and 1989, trade unions staged 18 general strikes against governments in 16 
Western European countries (EU 15 plus Norway), a number that increased to 26 in the 
following decade and to 28 between 2000 and 2006. In addition, unions threatened to stage a 
general strike a dozen times (see Figure 1 and Table 1). This phenomenon of a rising trend in 
the number of general strikes is particularly interesting for three reasons: first, the growth in 
the number of general strikes has coincided with the reemergence of concertation, 
particularly in the form of social pacts between governments, unions, and employers 
(Hamann and Kelly 2011; Hassel 2006). These pacts have frequently focused on the design 
and implementation of contentious reforms to pensions, welfare systems, and employment 
protection laws, and the inclusion of trade unions might be expected to reduce the level of 
anti-government protests, such as general strikes, which are often directed against these and 
similar issues. Second, the rise in general strikes contrasts a sharp decline in strike activity 
against employers in 12 countries of the EU15 plus Norway:  Between 1980 and 1982 an 
average of 16.6 working days per 10,000 employees were lost to strike action each year; by 
1989-91 this figure had dropped to 4.5 days per 10,000 and to 1.1 days per 10,000 by 2004-
06 (see Figure 1). At the same time, union density has also declined in a majority of these 
cases. The discrepant trends in general strikes, trade union density, and strikes against 
employers challenge some of our conventional ideas about trade union decline and union 
weakness. Third, although some of the countries with a relatively high level of general strikes 
also tend to have relatively high levels of economic strike activity (e.g. Greece, Italy, and 
Spain), general strikes have similarly been called in countries with historically low levels of 
strike activity, such as Austria and the Netherlands (Table 1). This suggests that theories 
accounting for economic strikes cannot easily be applied to explain the increase in general 
strikes.  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 1 about here] 
Based on these observations, we are interested in two related questions: How can we 
explain the increase in general strikes in Western Europe over time? And which factors can 
account for the variation in the incidence of general strikes across countries? To explore these 
questions, we construct a database for 16 Western European countries (EU 15 plus Norway).
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As general strikes are directed against governments and their (proposed) policies, our 
argument centers on political variables and the political context surrounding such events. In 
particular, we examine the degree of union inclusion or exclusion from government policy 
formation; the party composition of the government; and the strength of the government. We 
posit that these variables are better suited than economic and industrial relations variables to 
explain variation in general strikes both across time and across cases.  
The next section defines general strikes and provides an overview of empirical 
patterns of general strikes across Western Europe. We then briefly outline why existing 
theories of strike action are of limited value in explaining the patterns of general strikes and 
then present our own framework for analysis. The subsequent section discusses our data and 
methods, and we then present our results. The final section discusses our findings and 
concludes.  
 
Patterns of General Strikes 
There is no generally agreed definition of the term “general strike” or its various synonyms, 
such as “political strike” or “protest strike” (see, e.g., Walsh 1983). We therefore revise 
Hyman’s (1989:17) standard definition of a strike and define a general strike as “a temporary, 
national stoppage of work by workers from many industries, directed against the executive or 
legislative arms of government, to enforce a demand or give voice to a grievance.” A general 
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strike involves the mobilization by one or more national confederations of the whole of its 
membership, as well as non-union members, typically in protest against a proposed or 
adopted government policy reform, or following a breakdown in negotiations with the 
government about policy reform. Given this definition and our focus on the national level, the 
following actions would not count as general strikes: a stoppage by just one group of workers 
protesting government intervention; a stoppage by public sector employees protesting against 
the government in its capacity as employer; a national demonstration that did not include a 
general strike; a general strike occurring in one or several regions of a country. Typically a 
general strike will be a one-off action on a particular issue or set of issues. However, when a 
union confederation has called a series of general strikes on the same issue over a short space 
of time, each strike constitutes a separate mobilization. 
 The downturn in economic strikes is conventionally dated starting approximately in 
1980 (e.g. Edwards and Hyman 1994; Shalev 1992). Consequently, we trace general strikes 
from January 1980 until December 2006.
2
 During that time, a total of 72 general strikes 
occurred and an additional 12 threats to stage a general strike were issued.
3
 Figure 1 displays 
a general upward trend with peaks in the early 1990s and early to mid-2000s.
4
 Because 34 of 
these strike and strike threats occurred in just one country – Greece – Figure 1 also displays 
data excluding the Greek case; excluding Greece alters neither the upward trend nor the 
presence and timing of the peaks. Table 1 reveals the national distribution of general strikes 
and documents their concentration in the Southern European economies of Greece, France, 
Italy, Spain, and to a lesser degree Portugal, cases that also tend to rank high in economic 
strikes. These five countries alone account for 77% (65) of the 84 strikes and strike threats in 
this period. The remaining strike events (19) were organized in countries that have for many 
years recorded some of the lowest levels of industrial conflict in Europe: Austria, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway, while several countries that have recently ranked 
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high on economic strikes stand out for their absence of general strikes, e.g. Denmark and 
Ireland. Five countries experienced no general strikes or strike threats: Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Sweden, and the UK. In some of these cases such actions are unlawful, e.g. in 
Germany and the UK. 
General strikes have been called in response to a wide range of planned or actual 
policy reforms by national governments. We classified these policies under the following six 
categories: 1) wages, including basic rates, overtime, and holiday pay; 2) labor market 
reform, including bargaining structures, legal regulation of dismissals and redundancies, and 
non-wage issues such as work time; 3) pensions; 4) other welfare issues, including sickness 
and unemployment benefits; 5) economic policy; 6) a miscellaneous category for issues that 
did not fit any of the other categories, such as protests against the Iraq War. Many general 
strikes were organized around one major issue but a substantial minority featured a variety of 
issues. Figure 2 displays the distribution of the issues that motivated general strikes 
(including strike threats). If more than one issue led to a strike or a strike threat, each issue 
was counted separately; consequently, the total number of issues exceeds the total number of 
strikes and strike threats.  
Figure 2 evinces that government intervention to restrain the level of wage settlements 
has played only a modest part in the genesis of general strikes, particularly in countries other 
than Greece, where labor market, welfare, and pension reforms have precipitated the majority 
of general strikes. Furthermore, although numerous general strikes were called to protest 
against economic policy on issues such as taxation and public expenditure, the overwhelming 
majority of these have occurred in Greece. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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Since most general strikes protest against government measures, the next section 
develops a framework for analysis constructed around political factors to account for the 
substantial variation in general strikes across countries and over time. 
 
General Strikes: A Framework for Analysis 
Existing strike theories were developed to account for variations in the occurrence of strikes 
launched against employers, i.e. “economic” strikes. Theories of economic strikes can be 
grouped into four categories depending on their main explanatory variables: economic 
(business cycle, economic globalization), labor force composition, industrial relations 
institutions (union structure, bargaining coverage and coordination), and power resources 
(Brandl and Traxler 2010; Edwards and Hyman 1994; Piazza 2005; Scheuer 2006). These 
theories address different facets of strike activity (frequency, workers involved, days lost) and 
are not logically exclusive; therefore, they have sometimes been combined in models of strike 
activity (e.g. Franzosi 1995). However, theories developed to explain the existence, rise, or 
decline of economic strikes are poorly equipped to account for general strikes. For one, the 
empirical patterns displayed in Figure 1 demonstrate that patterns of general strikes diverge 
sharply from those of economic strikes. Insofar as economic or institutional variables can 
successfully account for the dramatic decline in levels of strikes against employers in 
Western Europe since the early 1980s, they cannot therefore explain why another class of 
strike action has become more frequent. This is perhaps not surprising because general strikes 
differ fundamentally from economic strikes: the former are directed against governments and 
their (proposed) policies rather than employers; they are often organized around broad rather 
than sectional or occupational issues, of concern to large segments of the population beyond 
those employed in specific firms or sectors; the issues that motivate general strikes, such as 
welfare benefits, are not generally those that are subject to regular collective bargaining 
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processes; and general strike mobilizations may well extend beyond the unions’ membership 
and activist base to include many non-union employees. Thus, it makes little sense to expect 
that explanations developed to account for workplace, company, or even industry-wide 
strikes will also be able to illuminate the causes and patterns of general strikes.  
Under what conditions, then, are unions more likely to react to government policies 
with a general strike? Theories of general strikes are rare. Existing research draws on social 
movement theorists (e.g. Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1978). Lindvall (2011) focuses on trade union 
power, arguing that general strikes are most likely to occur in countries where the union 
movement is moderately strong: weak movements will be unable to strike against 
governments while strong movements will not need to strike because governments will factor 
in union reactions when they formulate policies. Whereas the argument fits the Greek and 
Italian cases particularly well, it does not easily accommodate general strikes and strike 
threats in countries with low union density (France, Spain) or with relatively high density 
(Belgium, Finland). Alternatively, Nam (2006) argues that “protests,” a category that 
includes but is not coterminous with general strikes, should be more likely in countries with a 
poorly developed political opportunity structure and less likely in countries that offer citizens 
numerous channels through which they can pursue their demands (see also Tarrow 1994). 
Measuring opportunity structure by the strength of the legislature in relation to the executive 
and the judiciary, Nam finds that protests are more widespread in countries with weak 
legislatures, such as France and Greece. However, several countries with strong legislatures 
according to Nam’s data also have high levels of general strikes (e.g. Belgium, Italy, and 
Spain). 
In addition, specific studies of conflict in some of the most strike-prone countries, 
such as Greece, identify institutional and political factors that may be associated with trade 
union protest: poorly developed corporatist structures that limit union influence on 
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policymaking; a cross-party consensus on welfare and labor market reform that also limits the 
scope for trade union influence; governments that have been willing to legislate reforms 
rather than negotiate with the social partners; and unions that are well organized in essential 
services, especially the public sector, and that therefore have the capacity to mount effective 
strikes (Featherstone and Papadimitriou 2008; Lavdas 2005; Matsaganis 2007; Pagoulatos 
2005). These are potentially valuable insights into particular events in a particular country 
that have informed our own thinking in developing a framework of analysis applicable to a 
larger set of cases. 
Our framework to explain the patterns of general strikes conceptualizes them as 
political events as they are directed against governments and their (proposed) policies and 
therefore based on political variables. We focus on three main factors: whether governments 
include or exclude trade unions in the formation of policies on contentious issues that affect 
the interests of their members; the party composition of the government; and the strength and 
cohesion of the government. We expect other variables, such as the nature of the issue or the 
strength of the trade union movement, to matter less because theoretically, they are less 
clearly linked to general strikes. For example, union density is less likely to affect a decision 
to call a general strike because the target audience extends beyond union membership; 
similarly, reforms in different areas may be perceived as sufficiently threatening issues to 
warrant a general strike.   
 
Union Inclusion in Shaping Government Policies 
The policies of many governments in Western Europe since the early 1980s have involved 
downward pressure both on direct wage costs and on indirect costs, such as employers’ social 
security and pension contributions. Welfare and pension reforms have often involved some 
combination of cutbacks in benefit levels, restricted eligibility, and increased employee 
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contributions (Immergut et al. 2007). In addition, many governments have also sought to 
increase labor market flexibility by amending employment protection and working time laws 
or by adjusting collective bargaining structures. In pursuing such policies governments can 
choose to include unions in negotiations, for example through social pacts, or to exclude them 
and attempt to enact reforms through legislation (Hamann and Kelly 2011). Union inclusion 
may assist in “blame avoidance” (Pierson 1994), a process through which governments try to 
protect themselves from potential electoral backlash to unpopular reforms, in this case by 
sharing responsibility with the social partners. Alternatively, parties in government may 
respond to electoral competition by distancing themselves from unions and enacting reforms 
unilaterally, excluding trade unions from policy formation.  
Unions might criticize and react with general strikes to exclusion from policy making 
by their country’s government for three reasons: First, the industrial relations systems of 
many West European countries have institutionalized extensive trade union involvement in 
the regulation of terms and conditions of employment. Collective bargaining coverage 
averages approximately 80% in the EU15 plus Norway (although it is much lower in liberal 
market economies such as the UK). Union leaders in these countries may therefore expect to 
be involved in discussions on contentious policies that affect their members and may protest 
when excluded. Second, trade unions have been analyzed as agents of job regulation whose 
principal objective is to participate in the process of drafting rules to regulate the employment 
relationship (e.g. Edwards 2003; Flanders 1970). Consequently, unions may protest against 
their exclusion from processes of rule creation on issues such as pensions or employment 
protection. Third, social pacts have reemerged in almost every country in Western Europe 
since the early 1980s (the UK is the exception), arguably reinforcing the role of unions as 
valuable partners for governments anxious to engage in “blame avoidance” for contentious 
reforms and reinforcing the role of unions as a participant in policy formation. When these 
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pact negotiations fail and unions’ demands are not met, they may react with general strikes. 
By provoking the expression of widespread popular support for their criticism of government 
policies through general strikes, unions hope to affect change in the issue at hand (policy 
outcome or process, depending on what motivates the strike) either in this particular instance 
or perhaps in the future. As governments will have to face the same voters that are protesting 
in a general strike in a future election, unions may consider a general strike as a tool to alter 
governmental policies. 
 
Party Position of Government 
Second, we contend that it matters who governs, in particular, the type of party or parties in 
government. One line of argument suggests that general strikes overall should be more 
frequently directed against conservative governments than against leftist governments. Many 
unions are ideologically and organizationally closer to leftist parties and might be less likely 
to protest with a national work stoppage against leftist governments (e.g. Allern 2010; 
Anthonsen et al. 2011). This reasoning is also consistent with the corporatism literature, 
which asserts that leftist-led governments provide more room for unions to influence 
governmental policies through both party and governmental channels, making it less likely 
that unions will protest such governments (Molina and Rhodes 2002). 
 However, since the 1980s, social-democratic parties in several West European 
countries have experienced two sets of changes that may be linked to the rise in general 
strikes and to variation in strike incidence across countries. First, some of these parties have 
reevaluated their policies on issues such as welfare spending and labor market flexibility and 
have become more centrist, approximating the policies of their Christian Democrat and 
conservative competitors (see, e.g., Callaghan 2000; Kitschelt 1994; Piazza 2001). Second, 
some social-democratic parties have weakened their organizational links with unions as they 
11 
 
have sought to broaden their electoral appeal well beyond the declining ranks of organized 
unions (Hindley 1997; Howell 2001; Piazza 2001). Together, these processes indicate that as 
the special relationship between unions and social-democratic parties has atrophied, unions 
may become just as willing to strike against social-democratic as against conservative 
governments.  
 
Government Composition 
Government composition – single-party or coalitions, minority or majority – may influence 
unions’ propensity to stage a general strike for several reasons. First, coalition governments, 
common in multi-party systems, may afford unions more access points as they can attempt to 
negotiate with several parties that, in turn, can influence the governmental agenda. Single-
party governments, in comparison, are perhaps more difficult to access for unions, especially 
if the relationship with the governing party is not cooperative. Second, whether the 
government commands a majority or minority of legislative seats is closely related to 
governmental strength, which previous research has shown to influence the likelihood of 
union inclusion in policy formation through social pacts (Baccaro and Lim 2007; Baccaro 
and Simoni 2008; Hamann and Kelly 2011). Empirical research on Western Europe has 
evinced that minority governments have a shorter duration of office than majority 
governments (both coalition and single-party) (Strom 1990:116). In particular, on average, 
minority coalitions (372 days) tend to be short-lived compared to surplus majority coalitions 
(659 days), minimal winning coalitions (610 days), and single-party majority governments 
(878 days) (Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 2011:447). Consequently, other things equal minority 
and coalition governments are more likely to include unions in policy formation (Hamann 
and Kelly 2011) and are therefore likely to face fewer general strikes than single-party 
majority administrations.  
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 In sum, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: General strikes will be positively associated with unilateral reform through legislation, 
an indicator of union exclusion, compared to situations of no policy change and/or union 
inclusion. 
H2: General strikes will be negatively associated with accepted social pacts, an indicator of 
union inclusion when compared to the benchmark of union exclusion (legislation). Union 
inclusion may be negatively, or not significantly, associated with general strikes when 
compared to a benchmark of no policy change (status quo). 
H3: General strikes will be related to the policy position of the government on a 
unidimensional left-right scale. 
H4: General strikes will be positively associated with governmental strength. We 
operationalize “strong” governments as majority governments and “weak” governments as 
minority governments.  
H5: When majority governments rule, general strikes will be less likely for coalition 
governments than for single-party governments.
5
 
The next sections evaluate these hypotheses to explain variation in the patterns of 
general strikes across cases and across time.  
 
Data, Methods, and Analysis 
As noted earlier, we define a general strike as “a temporary, national stoppage of work by 
workers from many industries, directed against the executive or legislative arms of 
government, to enforce a demand or give voice to a grievance.” Working days lost and 
workers involved per 1,000 employees are the most commonly used measures of strike 
activity in preference to simple frequency counts (see, e.g., Monger 2005; van der Velden et 
al. 2007). Concerning general strikes, as with all large, multi-workplace strikes, data on days 
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lost and workers involved are extremely unreliable (Lyddon 2007). Therefore, we use the 
frequency of general strikes instead. Data on general strikes are difficult to collect because 
some countries exclude what they call “political strikes” from their national statistics, e.g. 
Belgium, France, or the UK, while other countries include them but do not distinguish them 
from economic strikes directed against employers, e.g. Denmark or Italy (Walsh 1983:50-51). 
Eastern European strike statistics are not available for the 1980s and post-1990 data are 
sometimes based on narrow definitions of strike action or supplied by trade union sources 
whose reliability is unknown (EIRO 2005). We therefore confine our sample to the EU15, i.e. 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK, in addition to Norway. We used the 
monthly European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) and the online European Industrial 
Relations Observatory (EIRO) as our main sources. We also consulted the Protest and 
Coercion Database at the University of Kansas, which contains daily logs of numerous forms 
of protest in many West European countries from 1980 to 1995.
6
 Furthermore, we consulted 
monographs and edited collections on the types of national policy reforms that often provoke 
general strikes, e.g. Immergut et al. (2007) on pension reforms in Western Europe. 
Discrepancies between these different sources occur because the Kansas dataset employs a 
very broad definition of general strikes, including regional and purely public sector 
stoppages. We recorded only those strikes that conformed to the definition provided above; if 
in doubt about a particular action, we erred on the side of caution and excluded it. Given that 
a general strike is both a rare and dramatic event we are confident that our sources provide 
comprehensive and complete data. 
The data include 84 total general strikes (including strike threats) within 58 individual 
years in 16 countries (EU15 plus Norway) over a 27-year time span (1980-2006). Of these 58 
individual years, strike frequency is greater than 1 in 20 individual years; that is, more than 
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one general strike occurred in a country in a given year. Given the lack of variation in annual 
strikes above two (only 4 out of 432 yearly observations witnessed more than two strikes), we 
chose a time-series logistical regression estimator for our empirical analysis, rather than an 
OLS or tobit model; hence our dependent variable is whether a strike occurred within a given 
year, not the number of strikes in one year. We utilize a conditional fixed effects logit model 
in order to control for possible country specific effects.
7
 Because the estimator automatically 
excludes panels with no variation in the dependent variable over time, our sample was 
reduced to 11 countries that experienced strike years (our original sample of 16 minus 
Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the UK), which somewhat reduces the zero skew. 
While strike data are available from 1980 to 2010, data on party position and social pacts 
(necessary to test our hypotheses) are only available until 2006. Therefore 1980-2006 serves 
as the time scale. The baseline logit model is: 
Pr(yi,t = 1│xi,t) =  Λ [β1 (PAi,t) + β2(Li,t) + β3(LRi,t) + β4(GCi,t) + Σk βkXk,i,,t +  εi,t]            
where Λ is the logit estimator: eβ/(1+eβ). Yi,t measures whether a strike has occurred in 
country i in year t. To overcome possible concerns regarding the inclusion of strike threat 
years in yi,t and the over-emphasis of Greek strikes we also conducted regressions, presented 
in Columns I-VI of Table 3, which exclude strike threats from the dependent variable (I-III) 
and Greek strikes from the sample (IV-VI).  
We conducted two series of regressions with our 11-country sample to gauge the 
proximate causes of general strikes. In one series, we examine the proximate impact of 
government’s union exclusion/inclusion on general strikes via two different proxies: accepted 
social pacts and legislation. We measure union exclusion via legislation rather than rejected 
social pacts because the latter fails to indicate whether governments proceeded with policy 
change without unions’ consent. On various occasions, rejected pacts were not accompanied 
by legislation within our sample – hence unions were not explicitly excluded from policy 
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changes as no change occurred. PAi,t measures whether a proposed (tripartite) social pact was 
accepted (1=yes, 0=no) and Li,t measures the presence of (unilateral) legislative reforms 
without union involvement in country i in year t (1=yes, 0=no) – hence, the baseline dummy 
category is no policy change. Of the 20 strike years that had multiple strikes, 7 had no 
legislative or pact activity, and therefore did not require the matching of these developments 
to their respective strikes. In 9 of the 20 multiple strike years, only one legislative/pact 
development occurred, yet on all 9 occasions, the multiple strikes were related to the same 
reform issue and thus were connected to the same legislative/pact action. In the remaining 4 
of the 20 multiple strike years, 3 of the 4 were repeated strike and legislative/pact 
developments on the same issue; put otherwise, legislative/pact proposals were followed by a 
general strike more than once in a given year, yet both developments were related to 
government’s original reform proposals. Only on one occasion, in Spain in 1992, were 
multiple strike events (one strike and one strike threat) and legislative/pact developments 
unrelated to each other. To account for these two different types of strikes, both observations 
were run in separate regressions; the 1992 general strike was included in the model presented 
in Column I in Table 3 (i.e. a model excluding strike threats), while the 1992 strike threat was 
included in the models presented in Columns I-II in Table 2. Data on accepted pact proposals 
and legislation were taken from the Hamann-Kelly pacts database (Hamann and Kelly 
2011).
8
  
In the second series of regressions, we examine the proximate impact of government 
position and composition, independently of government pacts or legislation. LRi,t measures 
the left-right position of the ruling party, based upon its manifesto, in country i in year t, and 
ranges from -40.12 (extreme left) to 51.7 (extreme right). Data on party positions were taken 
from Budge et al. (2001) and Klingemann et al. (2006).
9
 GCi,t, government composition, 
which gauges not only government strength (majority vs minority – H4) but government type 
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(coalition vs single party – H5), in country i at time t, is a dummy variable distinguishing 
between single-party majority governments (those where a single party commands 50%+1 of 
the seats in the lower house of parliament), multi-party majority coalition governments 
(coalitions with 50%+1 of the seats in the lower house), and minority governments 
(comprising single-party minority as well as minority coalition governments); single-party 
majority governments serve as our benchmark.
10
 If the government in power is a coalition, 
the ruling party is defined as the main coalition partner, i.e. the party from which the prime 
minister hails. In years containing multiple governments but no general strikes, party position 
and the government composition dummies were weighted according to each government’s 
(monthly) tenure within that year. In years containing multiple governments and a general 
strike, we used the party position and the government composition dummy of the government 
in power at the time of the strike. 
Σk βkXk,i,,t is a vector of economic and institutional controls for country i in year t. 
Economic controls used include real GDP growth and the (lagged) unemployment rate. 
Higher GDP growth is expected to lessen the incidence of strikes, while higher 
unemployment is expected to increase it; unemployment was run on a one-year lag to avoid 
multicollinearity problems with real GDP growth. Net government lending was included in 
our initial regressions, yet, even when run on a lag, it was significantly correlated with the 
presence of unilateral legislation, ruling party position, GDP growth and lagged 
unemployment not only over the entire dataset, but also within individual panels.
11
 Because 
this multicollinearity problem depressed the significance of all these variables, we excluded it, 
although its coefficient was significant and performed as expected when included in the 
regressions. GDP growth and unemployment data were taken from the OECD (n.d., b). 
Institutional controls include trade union density, bargaining coverage, centralization, 
wage coordination, and union confederal authority (Jacobs 2007). While union density is not 
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trend-stationary within most panels, we included a time trend to control for this, enabling us 
to examine the impact of trade union density levels (rather than changes) on general strikes.
12
 
Data on trade union density were obtained from the OECD (n.d., a). Bargaining coverage, 
centralization and wage coordination were included to examine whether union 
encompassment, organization, or coordination influences the presence of general strikes. 
Finally, high union confederal authority, that is the authority of peak confederations over its 
affiliates, could either increase or decrease general strike incidence. On the one hand, highly 
encompassing and centralized union confederations will bear the costs of collective action, 
and are therefore more likely to negotiate agreements without resort to collective action 
(Olson 1982). On the other hand, social movement theory would predict that centralization of 
power provides union leadership with the capacity to mobilize its membership and engage in 
collective action (Tilly 1978). In our sample, confederal authority ranges from 10%, low 
confederal authority, to 90%, high confederal authority; the measure is time-variant in all 
countries except the UK. Data on union bargaining coverage, centralization, wage 
coordination, and confederal authority were taken from Visser’s ICTWSS database (2009).13  
Centralization was included in separate regressions given its high correlation with wage 
coordination, bargaining coverage, and confederal authority, the latter of which is a 
component in its construction in the Visser database. Finally, we include a time trend to 
control for the lack of time-stationarity within our dependent variable.  
 
Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present results for the baseline conditional fixed-effects model. Beta 
coefficients have been converted to odds ratios; hence, values greater/less than 1 indicate that 
the odds of a general strike associated with a change in that particular variable 
increases/decreases. The ratification of a legislative act, which entails union exclusion, 
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yielded highly significant results across all models, increasing the odds of a general 
strike/strike-threat by a factor of roughly 4 to 5, lending some support for hypothesis 1. The 
accepted pact variable yielded insignificant results, relative to a benchmark of no policy 
change, on all occasions. Separate Wald tests were used to compare the difference in 
coefficients between unilateral legislation and accepted social pacts (sixth row from bottom, 
Tables 2 and 3). In all models, the presence of legislation was associated with a significantly 
higher general strike odds ratio than the presence of accepted social pacts, lending support for 
hypothesis 2.   
  Party position is significantly correlated with higher strike odds, showing that the 
odds of a general strike are significantly higher under a conservative government, 
substantiating hypothesis 3. The coefficients retain significance when strike threats and Greek 
strikes are excluded.  The minority government dummy is significantly associated with a 
reduction in the odds of a general strike, relative to single-party majority governments, 
substantiating hypothesis 4. Wald tests were used to compare the difference in coefficients 
between minority governments and coalition majority governments (fifth row from bottom, 
Tables 2 and 3). Results indicate that minority governments are also associated with a 
significant reduction in general strikes odds relative to coalition majority governments, 
offering further support of hypothesis 4. Like party position, the minority government results 
are not sensitive to exclusions. The coalition majority dummy is insignificant relative to a 
benchmark of a single-party majority government, suggesting that strike activity is not 
significantly different between the two types of governments, which refutes hypothesis 5.      
[Table 2 about here] 
[Table 3 about here] 
 Throughout the regressions, we isolated the pacts/legislation and party 
position/composition variables due to their significant association with each other.
14
 This 
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prohibits us, however, from examining whether the presence of legislation has different 
degrees of influence on strike odds across the partisan spectrum (i.e. whether strikes odds 
increase more prominently when legislation is implemented by left-of-center versus right-of-
center governments). Because logit models are, by definition, interactive models due to their 
non-linear nature (Kam and Franzese 2007:105), we can examine whether the change in 
probability of a strike in the presence of legislation is different for left-of-center versus right-
of-center parties. In order to do so, however, we must include two highly associated variables 
in the same model (Table 3, Column V) and we therefore interpret the results cautiously. 
Table 4 provides fitted probabilities of the logit model in Column V to examine the impact of  
the presence and absence of legislation for three types of governments: left-of-center (party 
position equal to the lowest 10
th
 percentile of the sample), centrist (50
th
 percentile), and right-
of-center (90
th
 percentile) governments. Mean values were inserted for all other variables.    
     [Table 4 about here]  
The probability of a strike is higher for all three governments when unilateral 
legislation is present. The proportional increase in strike probabilities (dividing the 
probability of a strike under legislation – Column II in Table 4 – by that in the absence of 
legislation – Column I), however, is significantly higher for left-of-center and centrist 
governments than right-of-center governments. Likewise, the ratio of strikes probabilities for 
a right-of-center to a left-of-center government decreases from 6.1 in the absence of 
legislation to 3.5 in the presence of legislation. Such results could suggest that left-of-center 
governments suffer more in proportionate terms than their right-of-center counterparts when 
they introduce unilateral legislation. A possible explanation for this finding may be that 
unions consider government unilateralism a greater breach of trust from their traditional 
political allies, and hence they may respond with greater (proportionate) threat.       
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The remaining economic and institutional controls either performed as expected or 
failed to exhibit significance. Positive GDP growth was significantly associated with reduced 
strike odds across all models. High (lagged) unemployment was significantly associated with 
greater strike incidence across most models. All bargaining institution controls were 
insignificant. When union confederal authority was included in isolation of bargaining 
coverage and wage coordination, its coefficient was significant at the 90% level, suggesting 
possible multi-collinearity issues with bargaining coverage and coordination. All other 
bargaining institutions as well as trade union density failed to exhibit significance when 
included separately. Lack of significance should not be particularly surprising, given our 
initial discussion about their failure to explain the upward trend in general strikes, as well as 
their limited variation over time. Bargaining coverage, for example, exhibits limited variation 
across Western Europe and has been relatively constant between 1980 and 2006. Finally, in 
line with our summary data, the inclusion of a linear trend indicates that the odds of a general 
strike have significantly increased over time. 
            
Discussion and Conclusion 
General strikes called by trade unions to protest government policy have rarely been 
systematically analyzed in the political science and industrial relations literatures, even 
though this form of protest has become increasingly common since the early 1980s. The 
surge in general strikes has coincided with a growth of contentious governmental reforms of 
welfare, pensions, and labor markets, and union protests have therefore sometimes been 
analyzed as a defensive and self-interested response by sectional interest groups (e.g. 
Matsaganis 2007). Yet the variation in general strike incidence over time and across countries 
suggests the significance of other factors. Our analysis demonstrates that while in many cases, 
unions use general strikes to react to governmental policy proposals, a far better (proximate) 
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predictor of trade union behavior is the exclusion of unions from government policymaking 
on these issues. Where governments excluded unions by opting for legislation, the odds of 
strike action significantly increased. Our strike and pacts/legislation datasets contain 
examples of legislation leading directly to a general strike on various occasions in six 
countries: Belgium 1984, France 1995 and 2005, Greece (multiple years), Italy 1989 and 
2003, Luxembourg 1982, and Spain 1988. At times, governments legislated when social pact 
negotiations broke down; as our data show, governments followed a breakdown in pact talks 
with proposed legislation on 27 occasions. On nine of these occasions trade unions responded 
to the announcement of legislation with a general strike (in Austria 2003, Belgium 1993 and 
1996, Greece 2000, Portugal 1988, the Netherlands 1982, and Spain 1985, 1994, and 2002). 
Even when governments included unions in pact negotiations on contentious reforms, this 
policy did not eliminate union protests entirely. Indeed on 17 occasions trade unions 
deployed general strikes as negotiations were under way, mostly to pressure the government 
into delivering more concessions (Belgium 2005, Finland 1992 and 1996, France 2003, 
Greece 1996-97, Italy 1991, 1998 and 2001-02, Luxembourg 2001, and Portugal 2002). In 
several cases the general strike was a direct response to a government threat to abandon talks 
(Finland 1993, Italy 1990, the Netherlands 1991) or was intended to instigate talks from a 
government reluctant to open negotiations with the social partners (Italy 1994, Norway 1998, 
Spain 1992). Overall, our research indicates that union exclusion from the process of 
policymaking has proved to be at least as contentious as the substantive content of 
government policies and reforms and is closely correlated with general strikes. 
 We also found a strong party position effect – the more rightist the government on the 
left-right policy dimension, the greater the likelihood of general strikes. Focusing on two of 
the most strike-prone countries, Italy and France, 10 of the 15 general strikes in Italy were 
against conservative governments, as were six of the seven general strikes in France. In Italy, 
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for example, the two Berlusconi administrations (1994 and 2001-2007) initially set out to 
legislate controversial proposals on pensions and on labor law respectively without union 
consultation. In both cases unions called general strikes, partly to protest the policies 
themselves, but primarily to force the government into negotiations (Hamann and Kelly 
2011:128-9). We also found a strong interaction effect between party position and union 
exclusion via legislation (Table 4). In proportionate terms, unions respond to exclusion with a 
general strike to a greater extent if the government in question is center-left rather than 
center-right, relative to a scenario where no legislation is presented. For example, the Greek 
social-democratic party PASOK was reelected in June 1985 with an overall majority of seats 
(161 out of 300) but swiftly proceeded to legislate a two-year pay freeze without union 
consultation. One-day general strikes were held in October and December 1985 to protest this 
unexpected policy from a government whose first-term (1981-85) policies had often been 
supported by the unions (Tsakalotos 2001). This case is also interesting because it reveals 
significant divisions between and within union confederations, a recurrent theme in the 
countries of Southern Europe. 
 Turning to other characteristics of government, we noted that the multi-party status of 
coalition administrations with the possibility of inter-party divisions suggests they would be 
more willing to include unions and thereby reduce the likelihood of union protests. We find 
that government strength matters – minority governments tend to be associated with reduced 
strike incidence relative to both single-party and coalition majority governments. This might 
be related to the fact that minority governments are more likely to include unions in policy 
formulation on contentious issues (Hamann and Kelly 2011), which in turn is negatively 
related to the likelihood of strikes. Coalition majority governments, on the other hand, do not 
witness lower general strike odds ratios than their single-party counterparts, refuting the 
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hypothesis that inter-party divisions in multi-party governments make them more open to 
union influence and therefore less susceptible to general strikes. 
 Our findings propose some interesting future lines of inquiry. In several countries 
union movements have protested government policies through demonstrations rather than 
strikes – Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden, for example (Fajertag and Pochet 2000). The 
restriction of our analysis to general strikes will certainly lead to an underestimation of union 
opposition to government policies; whether it has biased the coefficients on our key variables 
is less clear and would require further research.  
 Our findings are consistent with Pierson’s (1994) argument that governments 
attempting to enact unpopular reforms in the context of increasingly volatile electorates have 
strong incentives to pursue policies of “blame avoidance.” Social pacts can be interpreted as a 
classic mechanism of blame avoidance while the exclusion of unions from policy formation 
could deprive governments of the electoral benefits of blame avoidance strategies. The level 
and intensity of social unrest generated by a general strike potentially represents a high risk 
for any government and is consistent with the literature on the difficulties of retrenching 
popular welfare and pension systems. In light of our data, it would be interesting to explore 
the degree to which union exclusion and general strikes lead voters to actually punish such 
governments in subsequent elections. 
 Finally, our analysis has interesting implications for the literature on trade union 
decline and revitalization (e.g. Frege and Kelly 2004; Phelan 2007). If we analyze trade 
unions as agents of collective bargaining and worker representation at the place of work, their 
capacity to perform these roles effectively appears to have diminished significantly in recent 
years. Declining trends in union density and strike rates are widespread in Western Europe, 
although some commentators also note the persistence of high levels of collective bargaining 
coverage throughout much of Western Europe (the UK and Ireland are the exceptions) 
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(e.g.Pontusson 2005; Soskice 2007). Yet, if we turn from the extent of the bargaining process 
to bargaining outcomes, the impression of union resilience is called into question. The wage 
share in national income, a widely-used measure to proxy union “pushfulness” in collective 
bargaining, has been declining steadily since the late 1970s (Glyn 2006: 7). A low degree of 
income inequality, normally measured by the 90:10 ratio, has also been used as a measure of 
union power on the grounds that it captures the ability of unions to push up wages at the 
bottom end of the earnings distribution, restrain rises at the top end, and maintain substantial 
income shares for wage earners at the expense of owners of capital. Yet the 90:10 ratio began 
to rise significantly in a few countries in the early 1980s and the trend has spread to most of 
Western Europe since the early 2000s (Glyn 2006: 167-70), consistent with the idea of a 
decline in unions’ mobilizing capacity and bargaining power. Our findings on general strikes 
hints that the decline in unions’ mobilizing capacities may have been overestimated because 
the ability of unions to operate within the political arena in relation to governments has been 
largely neglected. General strikes are only one means by which unions seek to exercise 
political influence and are certainly not as frequent as lobbying bureaucrats and legislators or 
voter mobilization (Hamann and Kelly 2004). Nonetheless the resilience of this mode of 
action at a time when union influence in collective bargaining appears rather limited 
underlines the importance of recognizing that union action in the political system may be a 
significant factor in gauging their strength in addition to collective action within the industrial 
relations system. Further research on the outcomes of general strikes could explore the 
effectiveness of general strikes in more detail as well as examining the impact of divisions 
among unions.    
 In conclusion, our analysis has provided some novel insights into the reasons for the 
pattern of increasing frequency of general strikes across Western Europe that stands in sharp 
relief to the pattern of declining economic strikes in the same set of countries. While 
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established theories of strikes are poorly equipped to account for the occurrence of general 
strikes, our comparative longitudinal analysis provides initial evidence that political and 
institutional factors are better suited to explain the national and temporal patterns of general 
strikes.  
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Figure 1. General and Economic Strikes in Western Europe, 1980-2006 
 
Note: General strikes are reported for the EU15 plus Norway; economic strikes are reported 
for Norway and the EU15 but exclude Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg. Consistent strike 
time series are not available for these countries because of long gaps in data in the 1980s 
(Belgium and Luxembourg) and since the early 1990s (Greece). 
 
Sources: General strikes: author dataset; economic strikes: Bird (1991: Table 1); Davies 
(2001: Table 1); Hale (2008: Table 1).    
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Table 1: General Strikes Descriptive Statistics, 1980-2006 
 
  
Strike 
Years 
(including 
threats) 
 
Strike 
Years 
(excluding 
threats) 
Number of  
Strikes 
(including 
threats) 
Number 
of  Strikes 
(excluding 
threats) 
         
Total Panel 58 50 84 72 
     
Austria 1 1 1 1 
     
Belgium 6 6 8 8 
      
Denmark 0 0 0 0 
      
Finland 3 0 3 0 
      
France 5 5 7 7 
      
Germany 0 0 0 0 
      
Greece 18 18 34 33 
      
Ireland 0 0 0 0 
      
Italy 10 8 15 11 
      
Luxembourg 4 1 4 1 
      
Netherlands 2 2 2 2 
      
Norway 1 1 1 1 
      
Portugal 2 2 2 2 
      
Spain 6 6 7 6 
      
Sweden 0 0 0 0 
      
UK 0 0 0 0 
      
 
Note: Table indicates number of years that contain strikes 1980 and 2006.  
Source: As for Figure 1. 
 
.
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Figure 2: General Strikes Issues, 1980-2006 
 
 
Source: As for Figure 1. 
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Table 2: Logit Results for General Strikes Estimation (Odds Ratios) 
 
Proxy Variable Exclusion/Inclusion Gov't Composition 
Proposed Pact Accepted  0.984 1.102     
(1=yes; 0=no) (0.949) (0.715)     
Legislative Acts Passed 4.713*** 4.429***     
(1=yes; 0=no) (0.000) (0.000)     
LR Party Position     1.046*** 1.034** 
      (0.000) (0.019) 
Minority Government     0.103** 0.126** 
(1=yes; 0=no)     (0.022) (0.016) 
Coalition Majority     0.808 0.801 
(1=yes; 0=no)     (0.718) (0.720) 
GDP Growth 0.592*** 0.613*** 0.558*** 0.606*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment (Lag) 1.13 1.121 1.292*** 1.244*** 
  (0.132) (0.168) (0.001) (0.005) 
Time Trend 1.070** 1.048* 1.055 1.038 
  (0.045) (0.062) (0.172) (0.130) 
Union Density 1.023   1.033   
  (0.749)   (0.587)   
Confederal Authority 1.025   1.037   
  (0.315)   (0.142)   
Bargaining Coverage 0.895   0.958   
  (0.298)   (0.696)   
Wage Coordination 0.846   0.905   
  (0.737)   (0.851)   
Centralization   1.033   1.075 
    (0.595)   (0.319) 
Wald test of beta diff. 26.58*** 25.33*** NA NA 
b/w pacts and leg. (0.000) (0.000)     
Wald test of beta diff. NA NA 6.44** 7.44** 
 b/w min. and coal. maj. gov'ts     (0.040) (0.024) 
Exclusions None None None None 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1765 0.1593 0.1996 0.1634 
Observations 229 232 224 227 
Number of Countries 11 11 11 11 
Estimation Method is conditional fixed-effects logit model with country clustered standard errors.  Robust p-
values listed below odds ratios.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
interval 
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Table 3: Robustness Checks for Logit Results for General Strikes Estimation (Odds 
Ratios) 
 
Proxy Variable Excl/Incl 
Gov't 
Comp Excl/Incl 
Gov't 
Comp Integrated 
Proposed Pact Accepted  0.865   0.938   1.104 
(1=yes; 0=no) (0.655)   (0.810)   (0.775) 
Legislative Acts Passed 5.451***   4.789***   4.043*** 
(1=yes; 0=no) (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
LR Party Position   1.043***   1.047*** 1.045*** 
    (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Minority Government   0.164**   0.096** 0.119** 
(1=yes; 0=no)   (0.018)   (0.018) (0.026) 
Coalition Majority   0.956   0.755 0.775 
(1=yes; 0=no)   (0.936)   (0.636) (0.620) 
GDP Growth 0.575*** 0.568*** 0.584*** 0.547*** 0.554*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment (Lag) 1.035 1.151** 1.162 1.310*** 1.266*** 
  (0.554) (0.044) (0.105) (0.000) (0.003) 
Time Trend 1.054** 1.03 1.083** 1.066 1.076** 
  (0.048) (0.325) (0.034) (0.158) (0.024) 
Union Density 0.976 0.981 1.024 1.036 1.062 
  (0.660) (0.727) (0.738) (0.558) (0.275) 
Confederal Authority 1.02 1.027 1.026 1.039 1.037 
  (0.419) (0.338) (0.327) (0.143) (0.172) 
Bargaining Coverage 0.925 0.984 0.864 0.928 0.897 
  (0.501) (0.885) (0.228) (0.545) (0.281) 
Wage Coordination 0.968 1.061 0.806 0.863 0.828 
  (0.949) (0.906) (0.707) (0.807) (0.746) 
Wald test of beta diff. 27.18*** NA 25.02*** NA 15.98*** 
b/w pacts and Leg. (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Wald test of beta diff. NA 7.53** NA 6.89** 5.96* 
 b/w min. and coal. maj. gov'ts   (0.023)   (0.032) (0.051) 
Exclusions 
Strike 
Threats 
Strike 
Threats Greece Greece None 
Pseudo R Squared 0.1689 0.1612 0.1874 0.2125 0.239 
Observations 202 197 222 218 224 
Number of Countries 9 9 10 10 11 
Estimation Method is conditional fixed-effects logit model with country clustered standard errors.  Robust p-
values listed below odds ratios.  *, **, and *** indicate significance on a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
interval 
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Table 4: Fitted Probabilities of General Strikes  
 
  
No Legislation 
 
Legislation 
 
Proportional Increase 
(legislation vis-à-vis 
no legislation) 
Left Government 0.0371 0.177 4.77 
(Position =-21.2) (0.0140,  0.0602) (0.0176, 0.3365)   
Center Government 0.0752 0.3119 4.15 
(Position =-3.78) (0.0468, 0.1035) (0.1108, 0.5130)   
Right Government 0.2258 0.6193 2.74 
(Position =26.09) (0.0913, 0.3603) (0.3626, 0.8761)   
Fitted probabilities from Model V, Table 3.  95% confidence intervals in parentheses.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 The database is available from the authors upon request. 
2
 While our database of general strikes runs until December 2010, data on most of our 
independent variables are only available until December 2006. We therefore only report data 
until 2006. 
3
 Sometimes the mere threat of strike action can induce a response from government. 
Therefore, we also look at general strike threats even when the strike did not actually take 
place. To count as a “threat” a trade union’s or union confederation’s leadership had to 
declare its intention to call a general strike on a particular issue(s) and on a given date. 
Unions issued a total of 12 credible general strike threats, but called off the action in response 
to fresh government proposals: once during the 1980s, ten times in the 1990s, and once after 
2000. Three threats occurred in Finland, where no actual strike was held, and four in 
Luxembourg, where only one actual general strike was staged. Our measure of strike 
frequency includes both actual strikes and strike threats (the number of threats is too small to 
analyze separately) because in almost all of our statistical tests the inclusion or exclusion of 
strike threats did not alter the patterns of coefficients that were significant. However, where 
this is not the case we report two sets of results. 
4
 More recent data exhibit another strike peak in the late 2000s, with 10 strikes 2007-2009 
and 14 strikes in 2010 alone. 
5
 The number of minority coalition governments in our dataset is too small to conduct a 
similar analysis for minority governments. 
6
 These sources are available online at www.eiro.eurofound.ie and 
http://web.ku.edu/ronfran/data/. 
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7
 A Hausman specification test (Chi
2
(8) = 29.67) indicated that we could reject the idea that 
differences between a random effects and conditional fixed effects estimator were not 
systematic. 
8
 The Hamann/Kelly dataset includes reforms that are potentially unpopular with large parts 
of the electorate in the areas of welfare reform including pensions, wages, and labor market 
policies. The dataset codes the government’s first option to reform either through legislation 
or by extending a pact offer to unions; legislation following failed pact negotiations are not 
included. The dataset also includes information on whether pact negotiations resulted in a 
successful pact or failed. It comprises the same country cases and years used in this analysis.  
9
 We also conducted regressions with Swank’s (2006) cabinet and legislative party 
composition data, which produced similar results as the political data from the manifesto 
database. 
10
 We conducted alternative regressions using ruling party vote share as a measure of 
government composition (results not shown), which produced similar results in sign and 
significance to the dummy variables. 
11
 Pair-wise correlations between (lagged) net lending and real GDP growth, (lagged) 
unemployment, ruling party position, and the presence of legislation were 0.27 (p-value = 
0.000), -0.51 (p-value = 0.000), -0.15 (p-value = 0.004), and 0.19 (p-value = 0.000), 
respectively. Within panels, these correlations were markedly higher, exceeding (absolute) 
values of 0.6 and 0.7 in some cases. 
12
 While pair-wise correlations between trade-union density and a time-trend was weakly 
negative for the sample as a whole, 12 out of 16 countries witnessed pair-wise correlation 
coefficients of -0.8 or higher, indicating a strong negative trend in union density over time 
within panels. 
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13
 To keep the scale consistent with other institutional variables, confederal authority is 
reported on a scale of 0-100 rather than 0-1, as in Visser’s database. 
14
 Pair-wise correlations indicated that right-of-center parties were more likely to introduce 
unilateral legislation than left-of-center parties, although the coefficient across the 11 
countries was low – roughly 0.15. Right-of-center governments did not significantly diverge 
from their left-of-center counter-parts on proposing (accepted) pacts. 
